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Abstract
As the public pay-as-you-go pension systems of the aging industrialized countries are likely to
become seriously strained under the growing dependency burden, the question arises whether a
society should rely on private savings to finance old-age consumption.  This is an empirical question
about the magnitude and the flexibility of saving rates.  This paper argues that saving rates must
increase in an unprecedented fashion in order to compensate for the dependency effect.
The paper takes the German case as an example.  It analyses saving behavior in Germany
using three waves of the Income and Expenditure Survey.  It separates age and cohort effects;
computes the demographically induced change in the aggregate saving rate; and compares the
magnitude of these excess savings with the increasing burden of the pension system.  Finally, a
macroeconomic simulation model is used to explore possible paths of the cohort effects in saving
rates.
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1.  Introduction
1.1  Motivation and Outline
The expected change in the age structure in the European and virtually all industrialized
countries is dramatic and will lead to a substantially higher proportion of older people.  As a
consequnce, the public pay-as-you-go pension systems are likely to become seriously strained under
the growing burden of dependency.  If the public system is endangered, the question arises whether
more reliance on private provision will help.  While arguments pro and contra funding pension
systems have been discussed widely, a more concrete question is whether the projected gap
between current-level contributions and current-level benefits could realistically filled by an increase
in private savings.  This is an empirical question about the magnitude and the flexibility of saving rates.
The paper takes the German case as an example.  Although virtually all industrialized countries
are aging, speed and extent of the aging processes differ rather markedly across the industrialized
countries, and even within the European Union.  Germany will experience the most pronounced aging
3process among the EU countries, much more than the United Kingdom and the United States.
Within the next 40 years, the proportion of elderly persons in Germany will increase to more than a
quarter of the population.  Even more accentuated, the proportion of households headed by persons
aged 60 and above is projected to increase in Germany from 21 percent in 1980 to 37 percent in
2030.  The dependency ratio will about double, hence, twice as many elderly aged 65 and above
have to be supported by the same number of persons aged 15 to 64.
The implications for a pay-as-you-go pension system have been modelled in many instances.
One can keep the accostumed benefit level constant and compute the sky-rocketing contribution
rates necessary to keep the system solvant.  Similarly, one can compute the declining benefit level
while the contribution rate remains fixed at the current level.  As a third (and equivalent) exercise, one
can compute the deficit which would emerge when the rising pension burden at the current
replacement rate is financed by debt rather than rising contributions. I will call this deficit the pension
gap.  It is computed in the following subsection under a set of assumptions on demographic and labor
supply changes.
Can this gap be filled by private savings?  To answer this question, Section 2 is devoted to an
analysis of saving behavior in Germany.  In subsection 2.1, I employ three waves of the German
Income and Expenditure Survey, 1978, 1983, and 1988, in order to separate age and cohort effects
in saving.  In a second step, I apply the estimated saving rates on a population forecast in order to
compute the demographically induced change in the aggregate saving rate.  Finally, I compare the
magnitude of the emerging „excess savings“ (as compared to a constant saving rate) with the pension
gap.
The data exhibit cohort effects, although they are rather hard to measure precisely in three
waves.  How could they evolve over time?  To answer this question, Section 3 uses a
macroeconomic simulation model to explore possible paths of cohort effects in saving rates.  The first
subsection is devoted to a closed-economy situation and predicts strongly declining saving rates.
Subsection 3.2 shows that this decline can be offset in an open economy under very realistic
circumstances.  Section 4 summarizes and puts the results in perspective.
1.2  The Pension Gap
The mechanism of a pay-as-you-go pension systems is well known.  At constant benefit levels
-- in terms of replacement rates -- the contribution rate to the public pension system grows in
proportion to the ratio of pensioners to workers:
4c = p • r • (1-s).
where c denotes the social security contribution rate,  p the ratio of pensioners to workers, and r the
average replacement rate, i.e., the average pension devided by the average labor income.  The state
subsidy rate s reflects a pecularity of the German system which is financed from two sources.  The
main proportion of the budget, 1-s, is paid from contributions to the pension system.  The remaining
fraction s is a state subsidy which is financed by general taxes not linked to the social security
contribution rate.  The German pension reform of 1992 freezes this rate at about 19.2 percent
through the year 2010.
The ratio of pensioners to workers, p, depends on assumptions on demographic and
employment changes.  I use a simulation model described elsewhere that rests on the following
assumptions that depart in several instances from the official population projections by the German
Census and the German Bureau of Labor Statistics (IAB):
· Fertility: Fertility will experience a slight upturn once the awareness of population aging becomes
more widespread and in reaction to changes in social security policy.  This is a crude attempt to
„endogenize“ fertility in response to population aging.  It is unlikely that fertility will rebound to full
replacement values.  Departing from the OECD (1988) estimate, I assume a more gradual
increase, starting from the current net replacemente rate of 1.39 and reaching the OECD rate of
1.60 only in the year 2050.
· Mortality: I assume that German life expectancy will trace the development of other countries
that already experience a higher life expectancy such as Sweden, Switzerland, or Japan.
Specifically, I assume that the German life expectancy will reach the current Japanese life
expectancy in the year 2010; that it keeps increasing at the same speed until 2030; and that the
progress in life expectancy will only then start to slow down.  Accordingly, life expectancy at birth
in Germany is projected to be 78.1 years in 2000, 78.9 in 2010, 81.0 in 2030, and 83.2 in 2050.
· Immigration: In response to the changes in the German asylum policy immigration will be lower
than the IAB forecast but substantially higher than the Census prediction.  I assume that in the long
run immigration will be 80 percent of the IAB figures, i.e., about 115,000 immigrants in 2000 and
about 100,000 after 2010.
· Female Labor Force Participation: I first employ the projections of the Research Institute of
the German Employers Association (IW, Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft, Köln), namely an
5increase in female labor force participation from 34.7 percent in 1990 to 38.2 percent in 2000.  I
assume a continuation of this increase to 39.3 percent until 2010, remaining at this level thereafter.
· Retirement Age: In another crude attempt to „endogenize“ responses to population aging, I
assume an increase in the average retirement age by one year until 2010 and by two years from
2030 on.  Pensioners in the simulation model are defined as all persons as all persons who
become non-workers past the peak of labor force participation at about the age of 48.  This
includes persons making use of the various early retirement schemes in Germany as well as
persons claiming disability insurance.
· Sensitivity: I may finally note that different assumptions about fertility and mortality change the
projections from now through the year 2030 only marginally because both the generation of future
retirees and the generation of future workers are already in place.  Different demographic
projections begin to diverge significantly only after the year 2030.  However, different
assumptions about the labor force, in particular immigration, do produce significant changes from
the scenario depicted above.
Fixing the average net replacement rate at the current 72 percent, the resulting contribution
rates are displayed in Figure 1.  They reach 34 percent at the peak of population, departing from
18.7 percent in 1990.
 FIGURE 1: Pension Contribution Rate (Replacement Rate Fixed)
Turning the pay-as-you-go balanced-budget equation around, we now compute the average
replacement rate if the contribution rate would be pegged at the current rate of 19.1 percent.  The
resulkting replacement rate would fall from the generous 72 percent currently to about 40 percent in
the year 2030.  This is shown in Figure 2.
 FIGURE 2: Pension Replacement Rate (Contribution Rate Fixed)
6As opposed to many other countries, Germany cannot finance the public pension system by
debt without changing the law.  Otherwise, the pay-as-you-go mechanism is strictly enforced.  If one
would anyway keep both replacement rate and contribution rate at current levels, the emerging debt
is rather large.  It is depicted in Figure 3 and peaks at almost 140 billion DM in the year 2035.  As a
fraction of total public pension expenditures, the emerging deficit is 11.8 percent in the year 2000,
23.1 percent ten years later, and about 45 percent in 2035.
 FIGURE 3: Pension Gap
To put this number in perspective, the flow of private saving in Germany was 225 billion DM
in 1990, resulting in an aggregate private saving rate of 14.8 percent of disposable income.  Hence,
the pension gap in 2035 corresponds to about 9 percent of 1990 disposable income.  Current usage
of funds held constant, financing this gap through increased saving then would demand an increase in
the aggregate private saving rate from 14.8 percent to 23.9 percent!
Departing from this crude back-on-the-envelope calculation, the sequel of the paper is now
mainly devoted to two questions. First, will the shift in the age distribution „automatically“ create
more savings because cohorts in their prime saving ages will become more numerous?  Second, what
do we know about changing usages of funds: Since an aging population has less need for capital in
production, is it possible to divert these funds to finance the pension gap, holding saving rates
approximately constant?  The first question is subject of Section 2, and Section 3 will attempt an
answer to the second question.
2.  Age and Cohort Effects in Saving Rates
2.1  Micro Data on Saving Rates
Measuring household saving in Germany is not an easy task because there is little available
data.  I employ two micro data sets -- the German Income and Expenditure Survey and the Socio-
Economic Panel -- and aggregate data provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank.
The German Income and Expenditure Surveys ("Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichproben,"
EVS) are collected every five years by the German Bureau of the Census.  Their design roughly
7corresponds to the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey.  The surveys include a very detailed account
of income by source, consumption by type, and savings flows and asset stocks by portfolio category.
Extensive descriptive analyses have been carried out by members of the German Bureau of the
Census (Euler, various years).  The 1978, 1983 and 1988 surveys are available in public use form,
although at high costs and under tight confidentiality restrictions.  These public use files have been
analyzed with respect to household savings by Börsch-Supan and Stahl (1991), Velling (1991), Lang
(1993), and Börsch-Supan (1992,95).
The Income and Expenditure Surveys are representative cross-sections of all West German
households with annual gross incomes below DM 300,000.  They include some 45,000 households
in each wave.  These large sample sizes provide for sufficiently large cell sizes in each age category,
even for old ages.  The EVS therefore allow for a separate analysis of consumption and savings
patterns among the very old.
The data exclude the very wealthy households and the institutionalized population.  The former
represent about two percent of households who have annual gross incomes in excess of DM
300,000 (Euler, 1985).  For this reason, the data cannot be expected to add up to national
accounting figures, in particular not the wealth data.  Due to the rather skewed wealth distribution,
omission of the upper two percent tail of the income distribution results in a substantial
underestimation of total household wealth in Germany.  For the same reason, the saving rate
aggregated from the EVS is lower than the aggregate household saving rate reported by the
Bundesbank. EVS savings yields a net private saving rate of 12.0 percent while the "official"
Bundesbank figure is 13.6 percent.1
Omission of the institutionalized is only serious among the very old.  Although less than one
percent of all persons aged 50 and over in Germany are institutionalized, this percentage increases
rapidly with age and is estimated to be about 9.3 percent of all persons aged 80 and more.  Elderly
in institutions are more likely to have few assets and no savings.
The EVS are stratified quota samples on a voluntary basis.  The German Bureau of the Census
establishes a target number of households for each stratum defined by household size, income and
employment status.  To meet these targets, a large number of households is contacted by various
mechanisms; e.g., former participants of previous respondents to the EVS or other surveys are asked
                                                
1 This divergence is due to two differences in the base: The EVS omit the upper 2 percent of the income distribution while the
Bundesbank also includes non-profit organizations.
8by mail whether they would volunteer for another survey.  The ratio of final acceptances to target size
is published and was in excess of 120 percent in 1983.  However, this ratio varied between 20 and
150 percent across strata.  Moreover, response rates with respect to initial inquiries are not available
and are only vaguely alluded to as rather small.  Acceptance rates are lowest in the strata of low
income households, one-person households, and blue collar workers and self-employed.
I use the flow data -- income and savings -- which are measured rather precisely because they
are aggregated from weekly diaries and carefully cross-checked against yearly records such as salary
slips.  Most types of income add precisely to the national accounting totals with the qualification that
the data cover only the first 98 percent of the income distribution.  Net savings are computed as the
sum of purchases of assets minus sales of assets.  Changes in financial assets reported in the EVS are
deposits to and withdrawals from the various kinds of savings accounts; purchases and sales of
stocks and bonds; deposits to and withdrawals from dedicated savings accounts at building societies
("Bausparkassen") which are an important savings component in Germany (see Börsch-Supan and
Stahl, 1991b); and contributions to life insurances and private pension plans minus payments
received.  New loans are subtracted and repayments are added to net savings.  Not reported are
changes in cash and checking accounts.  Changes in real assets reported in the EVS are purchases
and sales of real estate and business partnerships.  Not reliably reported are changes in durables
(other than real estate).  Unrealized capital gains remain unreported.  To arrive at saving rates,
household saving is divided by disposable household income, consisting of labor, asset, and transfer
income minus taxes and social security contributions.
Households in the three EVS cross sections 1978, 1983, and 1988 are not necessarily the
same and cannot be matched.  It is therefore impossible to construct a true panel of individuals
although this would be most desirable for the separation of age and cohort profiles.  By aggregating
into age categories, however, I will construct a panel of synthetic cohorts and compare a
representative household headed, say, by a 60 year old person in 1978 with a household of the same
age category five years later.  The large sample sizes are of considerable help for the synthetic cohort
approach because aggregation units can be defined sufficiently narrow to assure homogeneity without
loss of statistical precision.
Figure 4 depicts the age-specific saving rates by survey year.  These age profiles are rather
similar across the three survey years, with 1988 significantly lower in the older ages. Saving rates
increase quickly until about age 37, remain fairly constant until retirement, decline during the first ten
9years after retirement but then feature a strong increase to a new maximum in very old age.  In the
1983 wave, the oldest age category has the highest saving rate over the life course.
 FIGURE 4: Cross Sectional Age-Saving Profiles
The renewed increase of saving rates in old age is a rather stable phenomenon in these data,
see Börsch-Supan (1995a).  Median saving rates, mean and median annual net financial savings in
absolute terms depict similar life cycle patterns.  In addition, the proportions of household with
positive respectively negative net financial savings echo these life cycle patterns.  The proportion of
households with positive savings is large (about 60 percent) and increasing with old age, while the
proportion of households who deplete their assets becomes smaller with old age rather than larger as
a naive version of the life cycle hypothesis would imply.
On should, however, keep the sample selectivity issues of the Einkommens- und
Verbrauchsstichproben in mind.  While including the very wealthy probably strengthens the
conclusion about increasing saving rates in old age -- the very wealthy are the least likely to
decumulate their assets --, the omission of the institutionalized may bias this profile upwards because
the sample omits those who are most likely to deplete their assets.  It appears unlikely, however, that
accounting for this selectivity problem would reverse the age-savings profiles in old age because the
share of the institutionalized among persons aged 80 and above is only 9.3 percent.  Even if all of
these households would deplete their assets completely, their inclusion in the survey could not offset
the 16.2 percent decrease in the number of those households who have negative savings.
More important is a correction of cohort effects.  As visible in Figure 4, 1988 saving rates are
substantially lower for older ages than in 1978 and 1883.  Part of the increase may thus be cohort
rather than age related.  Figure 5 shows that this is only partially the case.
 FIGURE 5: Age-Specific Saving Rates by Birth Cohort
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This figure depicts the same data as figure 4, but connects data points of equal birth cohorts
rather than those of equal survey year.  It therefore depicts true age effects, correcting for potential
pecularities of each birth cohort.  Conventional life cycle effects are visible for the younger
households, who experience a strong increase in their saving rates, and among the households
entering retirement, who decrease their savings.  However, in contrast to the naive version of the life
cycle hypothesis, the two oldest birth cohorts, born in the five year intervals around 1916 and 1911,
increase their saving rates.
A descriptive regression of saving rates on fifth-order polynomials in age and birth cohort
separates age and cohort effects.  The following table shows the regression results.  The age profile is
estimated rather precisely, while the cohort effects are difficult to measure when only three waves are
at disposal.
Dependent Variable: Age-Specific Saving Rates 1978, 1883 and 1988
 Independent        Estimated           Standard             t-
  Variable         Coefficient           Error            Statistic
    const         -136.941              38.471             -3.56
    age             15.525              4.483               3.46
    age**2          -0.599              0.197              -3.04
    age**3           0.011              4.128*E-3           2.82
    age**4          -1.134*E-4          4.122*E-5          -2.75
    age**5           4.390*E-7          1.581*E-7           2.78
    cohort          -0.350              0.136              -2.56
    coh**2          -7.729*E-4          1.617*E-2          -0.05
    coh**3           2.104*E-4          7.545*E-4           0.28
    coh**4          -3.123*E-6          1.402*E-5          -0.22
    coh**5           1.401*E-8          8.988*E-8           0.16
Number of Observations                        42
R-squared                                0.90153
Corrected R-squared                      0.86977
Durbin-Watson Statistic                  2.41911
Mean of Dependent Variable              12.01905
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Plotting the age polynomial for a given cohort yields a very early peak in the saving rate at
about age 37 together with a rebound after age 75, see Figure 6.
 FIGURE 6: Pure Age Effect in Saving Rates
The corresponding cohort effect is depicted in Figure 7.  It features a strong decline from the
early birth cohorts to the cohort born around year 1940.  Thereafter, cohort-specific saving  ratyes
increase slightly.
 FIGURE 7: Pure Cohort Effect in Saving Rates
I refrain from interpreting this pattern since it is based on too few variation over time.
Similarely, the predicted pure age pattern in Figure 6 may suffer from the small time variation in the
data.
2.2  Demographically-Induced Changes in the Aggregate Saving Rate
A change in the age distribution of the population implies a change in the aggregate saving rate
through several mechanism.  First, as seen in the previous subsection, saving rates vary with age.
Less households in the low saving age categories and more households in the high saving age
categories result in higher saving on an aggregate level.  As can be seen from the age saving profile,
this effect is ambigouos: Population aging reduces the relative proportion of households below age
37, but it also increases the number of households in the „saving trough“ after retirement.  The
increase in saving rates after age 75 is of little relevance because even after accounting for mortality
changes, the number of households of very old age is relatively small.
There are two additional effects.  First, a change in the age distribution also reduces average
disposable household income because more households will live on retirement income which is about
three-quarter of average labor income at current replacement rates.  Second, average household size
changes since household size is age-specific with a strong decline in size as households age.
12
Household sizes are much higher in younger years because of marriage and children.  In Germany,
there is no appreciable reduction in the household rate at very old age because the percenatge of
children taking in their aging parents is rather low.
Figure 8 presents a shift-share analysis of the aggregate saving rate, simulating the effect of
shifts through age-specific saving rates, age-specific disposable household incomes, and age-specific
household rates.
 FIGURE 8: Projected Aggregate Household Saving Rates
The projected changes are very small relative to the historical fluctuation in the aggregate
household saving rate.  Based on the 1983 cross sectional age-saving profile  (Figure 4), the saving
rate will increase very slightly.  Based on the age-saving profile generated by the regression on age
and cohort terms (Figure 6), the aggregate household saving rate is going to fall from 14.8 percent in
1990 to 13.5 percent in 2030.  Historically, the saving rate fluctuated during the last twenty years
between 13.0 in 1985 and 16.2 in 1975.
The gain in savings based on the 1983 cross sectional age-saving profile is about 3.6 billion
DM in 2025, a very small proportion of the pension gap at that time (Figure 3).  Based on the
regression profile, 13 billion DM in saving volume are lost vis-à-vis 1990.  In summary, little if at all
new savings are generated by the age shift in the population.
This result is in contrast to projections for the United States.2  These projections predict an
increase in savings of about 240 billion $ p.a. for the next ten years. This is about two-third of the
predicted pension gap, still less but a sizable proportion.
The difference to the U.S. is mainly due to the difference in age-saving profiles between both
countries.  In the U.S., households between age 50 and 60 are characterized by an increase, rather
than a decrease of saving rates as is the case in Germany.3  After age 60, U.S. households exhibit a
rather sharp decline in savings.  The difference in the location of the „hump“ in life cycle savings is
                                                
2 McKinsey Global Institute (1994).
3 Attanasio (1995).
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likely related to the later retirement age in the U.S.  It is noteable that the saving profiles in both
countries feature a similar increase at very old ages.
Having seen that age effects are unlikely to increase future saving in Germany, we now turn to
cohort effects.
3.  Macroeconomic Projections of Cohort Effects
The shift-share analysis in the preceding section rested on the assumption of constant age
specific saving rates.  This is equivalent to a complete absence of cohort effects.  In times of
population aging, however, capital becomes relatively more abundant while labor becomes relatively
scarce.  From a macroeconomic point of view, a society which maximizes consumption should
decrease savings to accomodate a growth path that requires less capital to equip the shrinking labor
force.  The mechanism is the falling return on capital.  This section provides estimates on the
magnitude of this effect, based on a simple growth model. It is a matter of taste whether one calls this
macro economic effects of population aging on saving behavior a cohort or a year effect.  As a
matter of facts, this is undistinguishable.
The empirical evidence on the question, whether age-specific saving rates vary indeed with the
rate of return on capital, is highly controversial.4  One may not be too irritated by the inconclusive
time series evidence as none of the concepts is easy to measure, and fluctuations in savings and the
rate of return have very different frequencies. However, it puts one in the uncomfortable position of
not being able to relate the results of the growth model in this section directly with observed historical
episodes.
In order to obtain an idea how an optimal saving rate will  develop in the face of population
aging, I employ the well-known Cass-Ramsey-Solow optimal growth model in a version popularized
by Cutler, Poterba, Sheiner and Summers (1990) in an application to the aging problem in the United
States.  An major feature of this model is an aggregate savings rate that responds to the relative
scarcity of labor and capital, hence demographic changes.  An important consideration, particular in
the case of Germany, is the sensitivity with respect to the openness of an economy.  I therefore
extend this model by allowing for an international determination of the rate of return on capital and
                                                
4 See for instance Boskin (1978), Bosworth (1982), Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhouse (1991).
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thus saving in a world that has many countries competing for the most efficient use of capital.  The
model is presented in full detail in Börsch-Supan (1995b).
The growth path is determined by two mechanisms.  In each country, the saving rate is
adjusted to maximize the present discounted utility from current and future consumption. Labor
supply is exogenously given, for Germany by the demographic and employment forecast that was
already used in Section 2.  The second mechanism is free capital mobility. Capital flows will occur as
long as the rate of return differs across countries.  At each point of time, the equilibrium capital flows
are therefore determined by a common interest rate.
I assume that a common world production technology in terms of efficiency units of labor.  In
other words, after accounting for differential labor productivity, it does not matter in which country
machines are located.  This assumption is less strong than it may appear at first sight because we can
account for productivity differences by rescaling the efficiency units of labor.  Per worker world
output at time t, y(t), is produced from k(t) units of capital per worker using a worldwide
neoclassical technology  y(t) = f(k(t))  that fulfills the Inada conditions.  Per worker output y(t) and
capital intensity k(t) are measured in a efficiency units, e.g., k(t) = K(t)/(egt L(t)), that reflect
technical progress at a rate denoted by g as well as differences in labor productivity across countries.
At the world level, wage rate w(t) and interest rate r(t) are determined by the familiar marginal
productivity conditions.  The world capital stock is the sum of the assets owned by each country,
denoted by ai(t) on a per worker basis.
The growth model is characterized by two equations of motion for each country. The first
equation of motion is each country's asset accumulation equation or budget constraint:
(1) dai(t)/dt  =  w(t) +  r(t)·ai(t)  -  ci(t)/ai(t)  -  [ni(t)+d+g]·ai(t).
Net additions to each country’s assets, dai(t)/dt, are financed from the difference between
gross national income on the one hand, and the sum of consumption and replacement investment on
the other hand.  Gross national income in country i is the sum of wages and interest income obtained
from the assets owned by this country.  Consumption, ci(t), is converted from a per capita to a per
worker basis by the ratio of workers to consumers, the support ratio, ai(t).  Finally, replacement
investment consists of depreciation at a fixed rate d, and the endowment of new and more efficient
labor with capital at a rate ni(t)+g.
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Maximizing consumption of country i subject to this country’s budget constraint yields the
familiar Euler equation for the path of per capita consumption:5
dci(t)/dt
(2) ----------  =  s · ( r(t) - (r + d + g/s) ) .
  ci(t)
The main mechanism in this second equation of motion is the tradeoff between consuming now and
consuming later.  This tradeoff is governed by the difference between the rate of return from capital,
r(t), and the gross rate of time preference, r + d + g/s, which consists of the net rate of time
prefernce, r , the rate of depreciation, d , and a correction term due top the measurement in
efficiency units, g/s .  If the time preference rate is high relative to the interest rate, consumers prefer
consumption right now, leading to an initially high and then decreasing consumption.  In turn,
consumption increases relative to the previous year if the market interest rate exceeds the gross rate
of time preference.  The factor of proportionality between the difference in interest and time
preference rates and the relative change in consumption is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
s.  The larger s, the more sensitive is current consumption to changes in the rate of return from
capital relative to the time preference rate.
Asymmetries between countries emerge when the exogenous variables -- the support ratios
ai(t) and the employment growth rates ni(t) in each country -- begin to differ. Starting from an equal
position, flows of capital from country i to country j make ai(t) larger and aj(t) smaller than k(t), the
average capital endowment of a worker in the world (in efficiency units):
(3) fi(t) = [ ai(t) - k(t) ] / k(t) .
The Ramsey model is a very crude model of a macroeconomy.  It traces only long-run trends
and those under very restrictive assumptions.  It abstracts from many feedbacks, and it describes a
highly aggregate level of the economy. The intertemporal utility maximization in equation presumes
perfect foresight.  Impatience is built in by allowing for a discount rate r > 0, but there is no
uncertainty or disagreement about the path of demographic changes, and social preferences stay
constant during a period of considerable social changes.  Some of the missing feedbacks are
cushioned by the assumptions underlying the demographic and employment scenario described in
Section 2. We already mentioned the exogeneity of labor supply.  Other feedbacks are more elusive.
                                                
5 Underlying is a constant-elasticity felicity function weighted by the size of population.
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The rate of technical progress may change with population aging (see Cutler et al., 1990), and fertility
may change in the face of an aging society (see Becker and Barro, 1988).  There is little empirical
guidance to model these feedbacks.
Population aging has very different impacts on the evolution of savings depending on whether
the country is a closed or an open economy.  While the assumption of a closed economy is one
extreme, particularly for a EU country such as Germany, the assumption of free capital flows across
the world is the other extreme.  We will inspect each case in turn, hoping to bracket the interim case.
3.1  Closed Country Simulations
For a single country, the growth model departs from the Ramsey model only in its time-varying
paths of the exogenous variables a(t) and n(t), support ratio and labor force growth.  In order to
achieve realistic orders of magnitudes, I fit the growth model to actual national accounting data for
Germany from 1978 through 1989, the year before unification.6  Estimates of a CES production
function yield a share of capital in total income of 40.99 percent, a ratio of capital to output of 2.70,
and an essentially unitary elasticity of substitution in production, in combination with a rate of
technical progress of 1.40 percent p.a., and a depreciation rate of 5.28 percent p.a.. Assuming a
steady state in 1989, the gross rate of time preference is computed using the steady state equation
for capital.  This results in  r + g/s = 0.099.  The most problematic parameter in the model is the
elasticity s  because it cannot be obtained easily from national accounting data.  I calibrate the model
by a grid search over s, fitting the predicted path of consumption to actual consumption data 1965-
1989.  This results in an elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption s = 0.6749, and
implies a net discount rate r = 7.8 percent.  This large discount rate indicates a high degree of
impatience and is in line with the estimated low intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption.
The model is rather insensitive to variations in the two elasticities and reasonable variations in the
parameters of the CES production technology.  The most crucial parameter is the gross discount rate
because it governs one of the Euler equation (2).  Reducing the discount rate leads to a smoother
path of consumption as impatience decreases, making intertemporal substitution more important.7
                                                
6 The data is provided by the DIW, Berlin.
7 A higher degree of intertemporal substitution does not appear to be warranted by the empirical evidence.  One may wonder,
however, whether such an assumption would change the following results in their substance.  This is not the case. Assuming a
substantially lower net discount rate of 3 percent reduces the gain from free capital flows from and to the NICs, for example,
by only little more than 25 percent.
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Figure 9 depicts how aggregate saving would react to population aging if we abstract from
trade and foreign direct investment in countries with different changes in their population structures.
Savings of course equal investment in this closed economy.  Because capital becomes partially
obsolete when the labor force shrinks, savings and investment go dramatically down.
Figure 9: Aggregate Saving Rate under Autarchy
Figure 9 also depicts the sensitivity to labor force assumptions.  Without any substantive
refreshment through immigration (e.g., as assumed by the German Bureau of the Census),
disinvestment becomes actually larger than depreciation, resulting in a negative savings ratio, i.e., in
an actual decrease in the capital stock.  However, this is not a likely scenario.  With some
immigration (e.g., as estimated by the German Bureau of Labor Statistics, IAB), saving and
investment rates remain positive although at a substantially lower level than today.
If some of the capital becomes obsolete, this should also be reflected in the interest rate.
Figure 10 depicts the rate of return to capital which is invested domestically or in countries with
similar population aging.  The estimates are not very sensitive to reasonable variations in labor force
assumptions.  They agree on a substantial decrease in the rate of return, about 21 percent.
 Figure 10: Rate of Return under Autarchy
3.2  Open Economy Scenarios
Since Germany has the one of the most pronounced aging processes among all countries, the
decline in the aggregate saving rate projected in the preceding section is likely to be an overestimate.
It is rather obvious that by exporting capital to less rapidly aging countries and producing there will at
least partially offset the reduction in the rate of return and, according to the logic of the neoclassical
growth model, thus also in saving.  The issue is not completely trivial in a system of many countries,
some of them aging faster than others, some of them not aging at all.  There will be competition
across the aging countries for profitable foreign direct investment in countries that age slower or not
at all.  A more realistic model must represent the interaction among many countrys with different
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population, capital and production structures.  Investment will compete across countrys, with
interactions among the industrialized countrys, crowding out some of the foreign direct investments
„projected“ so far.  As crowding out occurs, it is important to observe the absolute sizes of the
countries involved.
To this end, I feed the above growth model of with data from all OECD countries together
with the South-East Asian countries, arranged in 13 regions.  I disaggregate the European Union into
the major single countries (Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom), define a region of the
small countries of the European core (Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland), Scandinavia (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), the Southern
European Periphery (Greece, Portugal, Spain), and add the quickly growing countries of Turkey and
Ireland as a ninth region.  Together with the United States, Canada, Australia (combined with New
Zealand), and the newly industrialized countries (NICs) in South East Asia (consisting of Hong
Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan), we arrive at a
world now divided into 13 regions.  This covers all OECD countries (as of 1988) plus the NICs.
Although these countries make up only one third the world’s population, they account for almost 85
percent of the world’s output and consumption.  Still missing in this picture are the emerging Eastern
European economies.
The inclusion of Turkey at the European periphery is particularly significant.  Turkey has an
extremely different demographic outlook than the European core countries.  According to the OECD
(1988) projections, Turkey will face virtually no population aging, even after the year 2030, when the
South East Asian countries are projected to age quickly.  Since Turkey is also relatively big, reaching
Japan in about the year 2030, she can absorb a lot of capital in form of foreign direct investment.8
In order to describe the German demographic and employment evolution, I again use the
demographic and employment scenario lined out in Section 2, now based on the migration numbers
projected by the German Bureau of the Census.  American support ratios and labor force growth are
taken from Cutler et al. (1990) who employ projections from the U.S. Social Security
Administration.  Projections for the other European countries and Japan are less detailed and were
taken from Summers and Heston (1990) and the OECD (1988).  Data for the newly industrialized
countries is much harder to obtain.  I start with the 1990 support ratios published by the OECD
Labor Force Statistics for each of the NICs, and then take Taiwan’s projected changes in the
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support ratio and her labor force growth, published by the World Bank, as representative for the
entire NICs region.
Figure 11 shows, how different the relative evolution of the ratio of workers to consumers will
be in 5 of the 13 selected regions.  While Germany faces a steady and dramatic decline in the
support ratio, Turkey will experience no population aging at all, and the Southern European
Periphery only to a very modest extent.  In the United States and in the South East Asian countries
there is still employment growth.  Population aging begins to turn the support ratio around after the
year 2005.  The development is astoundingly parallel.  One should note, however that the level of the
support ratio is substantially higher in the South-East Asian countries than in the United States.
 Figure 11: Support Ratios in Selected Regions
                                                                                                                                                        
8 The odd combination of Ireland with Turkey results from the very similar demographic patterns in both countries.
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It is instructive to start the presentation with the results of the emerging capital flows, the
relative ownership of capital as defined in Equation 3 and displayed in the table below.
Capital Ownership in a Disaggregate Open Economy Simulation

















2000 14,8 1,62 8,89 1,67 2,66 8,05 4,27 6,65 0,62 -1,53 -11,8 -1,17 -7,29
2005 18,8 2,12 11,3 1,33 2,77 11,9 5,98 9,89 3,06 -3,81 -20,2 -2,47 -7,63
2010 21,5 3,11 11,7 1,45 3,59 13,5 8,94 13,5 6,40 -6,97 -27,8 -3,45 -7,37
2015 25,2 4,93 11,1 2,27 5,09 11,9 12,6 17,9 9,25 -10,3 -33,4 -3,94 -7,07
2020 29,8 6,33 10,8 2,82 5,84 8,85 15,2 21,6 10,77 -13,2 -37,8 -4,74 -5,82
2025 34,7 6,41 11,4 2,64 5,34 5,95 15,7 23,7 11,09 -15,1 -41,6 -6,29 -3,46
2030 40,2 6,28 12,8 2,64 4,89 3,79 16,0 25,4 11,41 -16,4 -45,0 -7,70 -1,45
2035 46,1 7,16 14,8 3,75 5,45 2,44 17,7 28,4 12,64 -17,3 -48,1 -8,09 -1,14
2040 52,2 8,84 17,6 5,59 6,51 2,70 19,9 32,3 14,59 -17,3 -50,8 -8,11 -2,29
Note: Net capital flows are measured as the relative difference in each countries per capita assets to the
world average per capita assets, see Equation 3.
Germany and the smaller European core countries, to a lesser extent Italy, Scandinavia, and
Canada export relatively much capital to the Southern European Periphery, with the bulk going to
Turkey.  These countries export capital during the entire period from 1990 through 2040.  Japan
exports a lot of capital until the year 2020, much less thereafter, when the aging process slows down.
The table illustrates two points.  First, crowding out of foreign direct investment is not really a big
issue as long as the number of regions in need of capital -- relatively speaking -- is as large as it is.
The inclusion of Turkey is particularly significant in this respect.  Second, capital exports from the EU
countries are very different across these countries, of course reflecting the different demographic
changes to come.  Most pronounced is the difference between Germany and the UK.
Figure 12 displays the effect of shifting capital profitably in still growing economies on saving.
Since saving does not have to equal domestic investment, the aging country’s saving is considerably
higher in an open economy scenario than in the autarchy case, although domestic investment remains
low.  The difference in net saving is almost two percent around 2020.
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Figure 12: Saving and Investment in the Open Economy
Savings remain higher than in the autarchy case because the world interest rate does not
decline as fast as in the domestic interest rate in a closed, aging economy.  The reason for a more
stable world interest rate is of course that capital can be used more profitably in a world economy
that is still growing or at least less shrinking than for instance the German population.  Nevertheless,
even in an open economy and with a substantial share of capital invested elsewhere, saving will still
decline to a dramatic extent.
I should not finish this section without a word of caution: The simulations in this section are
illustrative parables rather than projections, aiming at rough orders of magnitudes.  The simulation
results are rather robust against variations in the technology, but the capital flows depend very
sensitively on the demographic inputs and the relative sizes of the regions included.  They of course
very much depend on the absorption of capital in the receiving countries, in particular economic and
political stability necessary to warrant high rates of return.  In turn, the dampening of the decline in
saving would become even stronger when we would include the potential of currently under-
capitalized regions not listed in the 13 regions above, in particular the immense capital requirements
of the emerging Eastern European economies.
4. Conclusions
As the public pay-as-you-go pension systems of the aging industrialized countries are likely to
become seriously strained under the growing dependency burden, the question arises whether a
society should rely on private savings to finance old-age consumption.  This is an empirical question
about the magnitude and the flexibility of saving rates.  The paper takes the German case as an
example.  A simple computation of the pension gap shows that saving rates must increase in an
unprecedented fashion in order to compensate for the dependency effect.  However, the analysis of
German age and cohort patterns shows that this is unlikely.  First, the life cycle structure structure of
German saving rates will not generate a lot of „excess“ savings.  If one believes the (weak) evidence
generated by the separation of age and cohort effects, the opposite is the case.  Second, if cohort
effects are governed by the rationale underlying a neoclassical growth model, i.e., if an aggregate
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saving rate emerges that maximizes the long-run welfare of a country, then saving will strongly
decline, only somewhat moderated in the case of heavy investment in less aging countries.
The paper illustrates a well-known theoretical point.  In an economy with a shrinking labor
force, funding a pension system cannot work as an escape route from a rising burden of dependency.
Faltering rates of return prohibit this mechanism.  Section 3 of the paper shows that under
moderately realistic assumptions, foreign direct investment helps -- it actually helps considerably in
terms of consumption possibilities -- but the magnitude of the problem is too large to be offset.
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